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This case ;~ ises 4"Sh~ritl a~la~ 
~~,, 
to (1} the scope of the speech and debate immunity for 
congressmen and their aides: (2} the meaning of "public 
figure" under Gertz and Time~ · Inc~ v. Firestone: (3} the 
meaning of "public official" under New · York · Times · co~ v. 
Sullivan: (4} and the application of the New·Yorks Times 
privilege to verbal torts such as interference with contractual 
1... ~Q! cr-J ttN reM~ stol;l ~ ~d 
~IS'( o...v-.6-. v..N\1\ • ? ~ 
relations. 
FACTS "AND "DECISION .BELOW: Petitioner was 
• one of the first victims of Senator Proxmire's "Golden 
Fleece" awards. Petitioner, a professor at Western Michigan ___ ____......, .., 
University and research director at Kalamazoo State Hospital, 
had received a number of federal grants to study jaw-clenching 
as an indicator of latent tension and agression. The idea was 
to develop objective means of spotting stress or hostility; 
NASA, the Office of Naval Research, and others were interested 
in the research in hopes of developing a way of screening and 
monitoring astronauts, pilots, and other critical personnel. A 
large amount of the research was done on primates. The 
electrical activity of their jaw muscles was measured in 
various stressful and non-stressful situations and under the 
effect of various stimulants and depressants. NASA, ONR, and 
the National Science Foundation had funded some of this 
research, and at the time of Senator Proxmire's actions 
petitioner had grant applications pending before NSF, the 
National Institute of Drug Abuse, and the National Institute of 
Mental Health. 
Proxmire's assistant, Schwartz, turned up petitioner's 
research and recommended it as a candidate for the "Golden 
Fleece" award. A press release was drafted, and Schwartz read 
its contents to petitioner for comment. Petitioner protested 
its inaccuracy and cited evaluations by the granting agencies 
that his work was worthwhile, but Proxmire went ahead with the 
release. 
-
Three days later, Proxmire read the contents of the ----___... 
2. 
- release on the Senate floor. The release characterized 
petitioner's work as research into what angers monkeys, gnd 
intimated that petitioner was collecting from different 
agencies for the same work and making a personal fortune from 
the government through his research. The following month, 
Proxmire sent out newsletters to 100,000 constituents repeating 
---- -------------------------------------------------his attacks on petitioner's research, and later in the year he 
went on television and radio shows to continue his campaign 
against petitioner. Meanwhile Schwartz contacted the various 
~
agencies that funded or proposed to fund petitioner's research 
and applied pressure to cut off the funding. According to 
petitioner, Schwartz misrepresented various facts about 
petitioner and his research and threatened the agencies with 
retaliation unless they took. action against him. Petitioner's 
funding was ended, a fact for which Proxmire took credit in a 
subsequent newsletter. 
Petitioner brought a diversity suit against Proxmire 
and Schwartz for defamation, intentional interference with 
contracts and intentional interference with prospective 
advantage. The district court granted summary judgment for 
Proxmire and Schwartz, holding that all of their conduct was 
immunized under the Speech and Debate Clause, that even if 
there were no immunity they enjoyed a qualified privilege under 
New·York · Times · co~ because petitioner was both a public 
official and a public figure, that no malice in the New ·York 
Times · co~ sense could be proved in this case, and that even if 
petitioner were a private figure state law defenses of fair 
3. 
( _ 
comment and interested communications would bar liability. 
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. It agreed 
that Proxmire and Schwartz enjoyed Speech and Debate Clause 
immunity as to the press release and constituent newsletter but 
not as to the radio and TV broadcasts or the followup 
communications by Schwartz. It agreed, however, that 
petitioner was a public figure, as he had voluntarily sought 
public funding, had published scholarly articles, had been the ,....____........___ 
subject of several local newspaper articles, and had been able 
to schedule a press conference to respond to Proxmire's attack. 
The court distinguished Time; · Inc~ v. F~resyone, 424 u.s. 448 
(1976), on the ground that petitioner had voluntarily sought 
public founds and had in his scholarly articles affirmed the 
soundness of his research. As the evidence did not raise a 
question of material fact as to ma~ice, New · York · Times · co~ 
required dismissal of the defamation action. The intentional 
interference actions also required malice in the New ·York ·Times 
Co; sense and therefore properly were dismissed. The court did 
not address the question whether petitioner was a "public 
official" under Gertz and New · York ·~imes · co~ or whether state 
law defenses and privileges also would bar the suit. 
CONTENTIONS: Petitioner argues that · the press release 
and constituent newsletters went beyond the kinds of 
communications immunized under the Speech and Debate Clause in 
Gravel v. united ~ States, 408 u.s. 610 (1972). The 
classification of petitioner as a public figure is inconsistent 
with Gertz v. Robert ·welch; · Inc~, 418 u.s. 323 (1974), and 
4. 
5. 
Firestone. The assessment of malice by the court below was 
based on demonstrably incorrect statements about the record and 
was erroneous. 
The respondents rest mainly on the opinion of the 
court below. 
DISCUSSION: The speech and debate issue is important, ~ 
although a close question. The court of appeals attempted to 
assess what was the proper dissemination of legislative 
information in light of the "informing function" of Congress. 
It felt the press release and newsletters here were closer to 
Gravel, when a legislator brought to public attention a matter 
of public significance, than to ~ v. McMillan, 412 u.s. 306 
(1973), when the Court recognized that public dissemination of 
'- actionable information could be outside the scope of the 
· immunity. The question turns on an essentially factual issue: 
the need for Proxmire to resort to a press release and 
newsletters to bring to public attention the facts about 
petitioner's research. The line drawn by the court below 
conflict directly with any decision of this Court. The 
question is important, however, and the area -is one that could 
benefit from guidance by this Court. 
The resolution of the Gertz issue is palpably 
inconsistent with both Gertz and Firestone. It seem wholly 
~
unrealistic to tie "public figure" status to the receipt of 
public funds: It would be hard not to ard a welfare 




below. Nor should publication of scholarly articles or local 
I~ newspaper coverage convert petitioner into a public figure. 
Mrs. Firestone had courted public attention more openly and 
notoriously. Petitioner never undertook voluntarily the risk 
of calumny inherent to public life nor acquired the ready 
access to the med1a necessary to rebut effectively scandalous 
untruths. Under Gertz and Firestone, it was improper to /tyv 
classify him as anything but a private figure. 
In addition, the transposition of the New ·York ·Times 
malice standard to the intentional interference torts presents 
an independently certworthy issue. The court believed that the 
"malice" that is an element of these torts is equivalent to the 
"malice" required by New ·York ·Times. As this Court has 
stressed on several occasions, however, New ·York ·Times used the 
term in a special sense, and did not mean to advert to the 
"desire to do harm" to which common law malice refers. The 
reverse also should be true. It is not at all clear that a 
state law tort that has as its elements an intentional and 
deliberate interference with the contractual rights of another 
person also must incorporate a "knowing or reckless disregard 
of the truth" standard. Schwartz's actions after the press 
release appear to have been independently actionable, and the 
application of New ·York ·Times to this conduct seems dubious at 
best. 
The importance of the Gertz and intentional 
interference issues in this case is reinforced by the seeming 




reach. It seems incredible to regard petitioner, who received 
public money to support ~is research, as a "public official" 
under Gertz. The resolution of the state law issues by the 
district court also seem questionable. The conduct of Schwartz 
in particular appears to have been far outside any possible 
"fair comment" or "interested communication" defense. Further, 
the district court did not advert to the independent claims 
against Schwartz for intentional interference with contract and 
prospective advantage. As a prudential matter, it probably is 
proper to discourage harassing suits against Congressmen 
undertaking controversial but important functions. See 
oombro~ski v.Eestland, 387 u.s. 82, 85 (1967). On the other 
hand, the facts of this case are far from ordinary, and suggest 
the need to afford injured individuals some form of redress 
within the judicial process. In sum, the Gertz and intentional J 
interference issues seem certworthy both as a general matter 
and in the context of this case. 
There is a response. 
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j , S. KIMMITT 
UCAETARY 
Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk of the Supreme Court 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Mr. Rodak : 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY 
WASHINGTON, D .C. 20510 
March 26, 1979 
RECEIVED 
MAR 2 8 1979 
OFFICE OF TH£ CLERK 
SUPREME COURT, U.S. 
For your information, I am enclosing a copy of Senate 
Resolution 113, which passed the Senate on March 22, 1979. 
Sincerely, 
S. Res. 113. 
In the Senate of the United States, 
March 22 (legislative day, February 22), 1979. 
Whereas the Supreme Court of the United States on January 8, 
1979, issued a writ of certiorari in the case of Hutchinson 
v. Proxmire, et al.; and 
Whereas this civil action against the Senator from Wisconsin 
(Mr. Proxmire) seeks damages for actions that were per-
formed within the scope of the Senator's duties and respon-
sibilities as a Member of the Senate under the Constitution 
of the United States; and 
Whereas the Senate, by Senate Resolution 463, Ninety-fourth 
Congress, has supported the defense of Senator Proxmire in 
defending the civil action brought against him for the pur-
pose of protecting the interests of the Senate; and 
=::'""--·· :=....:.-vTnereasinthis case the Supreme Court will consider the scope 
and meaning of the protection provided to Members of the 
Congress by Article I, Section 6, of the United States 
Constitution, the Speech and Debate clause, including the 
application of this provision to Senators and their aides, and 
the types of activity protected; and 
Whereas this case involves the informing function of the Con-
gress and the right of Members of the Senate to inform their 
constituents, colleagues, and the public; and 
2 
Whereas this case involves the investigation and oversight func-
tions of the Congress and the right of the Members of the 
Senate to obtain information in their contact with the ex-
ecutive branch of the Government; and 
Whereas the District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals 
have recognized the application of the Speech and Debate 
clause to the conduct complained of in this case; and 
Whereas a decision in this case may impair the constitutional 
independence and prerogatives of every individual Senator, 
and of the Senate as a whole; and 
Whereas the Senate of the United States has a responsibility to 
insure that its int~rests are properly and completely repre-
sented before the Supreme Court: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That there is established a committee of the 
Senate consisting of the President pro tempore of the Senate, 
the Majority Leader and Minority Leader of the Senate, and the 
chairman and ranking minority member of the Committee on 
Rules and Administration. Such committee is authorized and di-
rected to appear and/ or to file, on behalf of the Senate of the 
United States, a brief as amicus curiae in the case-oi~-iuteiliu- --.::-
son v. Proxmire et al., now pending in the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 
SEc. 2. The Secretary of the Senate shall transmit a copy 
of this resolution to the Supreme Court. 
Attest: 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543 
March 29 , 19 79 
MEMORANDUM TO THE COURT 
RE: Hutchinson v. Proxrnire 
No. 78-680 
The attached Resolution in the above-
entitled case was received yesterday from the 
Secretary of the United States Senate. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~01 tVlf' 
Michael Rodak, Jr. 
Clerk ' 
Attachment 
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MEMORANDUM 'TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 78-680 Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
/ 
I overlooked calling attention to the "public 
figure" issue in this case. 
My notes indicate a substantial number--but 
perhaps not five--thought respondent was not a public 
figure. I agree but I am not sure as to the votes. 
If four others so vote, it will be a simple matter to 
add this holding. 
Regards, 
To: Mr . Jm!t i 
Mr . JU<Jb~ ~ / Mr . Justic · l'l'P ·t- J 
Mr. Justi , V·u ;!~ ... 
Mr. ,Tuot1 n•:J BL ·. :<c 'J.n 
Mr. Ju"st i.e,(' ].'() Jll 
Ml' . Jv.r.;·'· Gt.1 j ,1-·'!'Ui s t 
Mr. ;,·u.r.jt.ioo f~tc~ ·~-·'"ons 
From : The Chief Justice 
\ 
Ist DRAFT 
Circulat ed: MAY 2 G 1979 






Ronald R. Hutchinson, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
William Proxmire and 
Morton Schwartz. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit. 
~5/27-zf' 
[June -, 1979] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BuRGER delivered the opinion of the J ~AA.L.t. 
Court. '"'"-7- . - .._ 
·we granted certiorari,- U.S.- (1978), to resolve three ~ 
issues: ( 1) Whether a Member of Congress is protected by the 5 pye.- }J , 
Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, § 6, .. 
against suits for allegedly defamatory statements made by the ~
Member in press releases and newsletters; (2) Whether peti- -A J 
tioner Hutchinson is either a "public figure" or~ "public of- ~ ~ 
ficial ," thereby making applicable the "actual malice" stand-~ A1~ 
1 
,--
ard of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964); 1 '~ 
and (3) ~ether respondents were entitled to summary 1 ~; · -
judgment. - · 
Ronald Hutchinson, a research behavioral scientist, sued ~ ~ 
respondents , William Proxmire, a United States Senator, and £),. ~- , I 
hi11 legislative assistant, Morton Schwartz, for defamation aris-~
ing out of Proxmire's giving what he called his "Golden ~ c----
Fleece" award. The "award" went to federal agencies that / ~?.... d 
J'-0 c.! \ 1 Neither the District Court nor t.he Court of Appeals considered whether the standard of New York Times v. Su!livan, 376 U. S. 254 
( 1964), can apply to an individual defendant rather than to a media de-
fendant. At oral argument, counsel for Hutchinson stated that he had 
not conceded that the New York Times standard did apply. Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 18. We express no opinion on the issue. 
78-680-0PINION 
2 HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE 
had sponsored Hutchinson's research. Hutchinson alleged 
that in making the award and publicizing it nationwide, re-
spondents had libeled him, damaging him in his prof~ional 
and academic standing, and had interfered with his contrac-
tual relations. The District Court granted summary judg-
ment for respondents and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 
We reverse that part of the Court of Appeals judgment 
holding that the Speech or Debate Clause protects press re-
leases and newsletters. For reasons hereafter discussed, we 
do not reach the other questions raised in the petition for 
certiorari. 
I 
Respondent Proxmire is a United States Senator from Wis-
consm. In March 1975 he initiated the "Golden Fleece of 
the Month Award" to publicize what he perceived to be the 
most egregious examples of wasteful governmental spending. 
The second such award, in April 1975. went to the National 
Science Foundation, the National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration, and the Navy, through the Office of Na.val Re-
search, for spending almost half a million dollars during the 
preceding seven years to fund Hutchinson's research. 2 
At the time of the award, Hutchinson was director of re-
search at the Kalamazoo State Mental Hospital. Before that 
he had held a similar position at the Ft. Custer State Home. 
Both the hospital and the home are operated by the Michigan 
State Department of Mental Health; he was therefore a state 
employee in both positions. During most of the period in 
question he was also an adjunct professor at Western Mich-
igan University. When the research department at Kalama-
zoo State Mental Hospital was closed in June 1975, Hutchin-
son became research director of the Foundation for Behavioral 
2 There is disagreement over the actual total. The speech said the total 
was "over $500,000." In preparation for trial, both sides have offereq 




HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE 3 
Re~earch, a no~profit organization. The research funding 
was transferred from the hospital to the foundation. 1 
The bulk of Hutchinson's research was devoted to the study 
of emotional behavior. In particular, he sought an objective 
measure of aggression, concentrating upon the behavior pat::. 
terns of certain animals, such as the clenching of jaws when 
they were exposed to various aggravating stressful stimulii.3 
The National Aeronautics and Space Agency and the Navy 
were interested in the potential of this research for resolving 
problems associated with confining humans in closed quarters 
for extended periods of time in space and undersea explor~;ttion. 
The Golden Fleece Award to the agencies that had spon-
sored Hutchinson's research was based upon research done for · 
Proxmire by Schwartz. While seeking evidence of wasteful 
governmental spending, Schwartz read copies of reports that 
Hutchinson had prepared under grants from NASA. Those 
reports revealed that Hutchinson had received grants from the 
Office of Naval Research, the National Science Foundation, 
and the Michigan State Department of Mental Health. 
Schwartz also learned that other federal agencies had funded 
Hutchinson's research. After contacting a number of federal 
and state agencies, Schwartz helped to prepare a speech for 
Proxmire to present in the Senate; the text was then incorpo-
rated into an advance press release, with only the addition of 
introductory and concluding sentences. Copies were sent to 
•• 3 Reports of Hutchinson's research were published in scientjfic journals. 
The research is not unlike the studies of ~ reported in less technical 
periodicals such as the National Geographic Magazine. E. g., Fossey, 
"More Years with 1\Iountain Gorillas," National Geographic Magazine 574 
(1971); Galdikas-Brindamour, "Orangutans, Indonesia's 'People of the 
Forest,'" National Geographic 444 (1975); Goodall, "Life and Death at 
Combe," National Geographic 592 (1979); Goodall, "New Discoveries 
Among Africa's Chimpanzees," National Geographic Magazine 272 (1963); 
Strum, "Life with the 'Pumphouse Gang': New Insights into Baboon Be-




4 HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE 
a mailing list of 275 members of the news media throughout 
the United States and abroad. 
Schwartz telephoned Hutchinson before April 18 to tell him 
of the award; Hutchinson protested that the release contained 
an inaccurate and incomplete summary of his research. 
Schwartz replied that he thought the summary was fair. 
In the speech Proxmire described the federal grants for 
Hutchinson's research, concluding with the following com-
ments: 4 
"The funding of this nonsense makes me almost angry 
enough to scream and kick or even clench my jaws. It 
seems to me it is outrageous. 
"Dr. Hutchinson's studies should make the taxpayers . 
as well as his monkeys grind their teeth. In fact, the 
good doctor has made a fortune from his monkeys and . 
in the process made a monkey out of the American 
taxpayer. 
"It is time for the Federal Government to get out of 
this 'monkey business.' In view of the transparent 
worthlessness of Hutchinson's study of jaw-grinding and . 
biting by angry or hard-drinking monkeys, it is time we 
put a stop to the bite Hutchinson and the bureaucrats 
who fund him have been taking of the taxpayer." 121. 
Cong. Rec. 10803 (1975). 
In May 1975, Proxmire referred to his Golden Fleece 
4 Prm.:mire is not certain that he actually delivered the speech on the 
Senate floor. He said that he might have merely inserted it into the Con-
gressional Record. App., at 220-221. In light of that uncertainty, the 
question arises whether a nondclivered speech printed in the Congressional 
Record is covered .by t.he Speech or Debate Clause. This Court has never 
passed on tha.t question and neither the District Court nor the Court of 
Appeals seemed to think it was important. Nevertheless, we assume, with-
out deciding, that a speech printed in the Congressional Record carrjes 
immunity under the Speech or Debate Clause as though delivered on the 
floor. . 
78-680-0PINION 
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Awards in a newsletter sent to about 100,000 people whose 
names were on a mailing list that included constituents 'in 
Wisconsin as well as persons in other states. The newsletter 
repeated the essence of the speech and the press release. 
Later in 1975, Proxmire appeared on a television interview 
program where he referred to Hutchinson's research, though 
he did not mention Hutchinson by name. 5 
The final reference to the research came in a newsletter in 
February 1976. In that letter Proxmire summarized his 
Golden Fleece Awards of 1975. The letter did not mentio'n 
Hutchinson's name, but it did report: 
"- The NSF, the Space Agency, and the Office of 
Naval Research won the 'Golden Fleece' for spending 
jointly $500,000 to determine why monkeys clench their 
jaws. 
"All the studies on why monkeys clench their jaws 
were dropped. No more monkey business." App., at 
168-171. 
After the award was announced, Schwartz, acting on behalf 
of Proxmire, contacted a number of the federal agencies that 
has sponsored the research. In his deposition he stated that 
he did not attempt to dissuade them from continuing to fund 
the research but merely discussed the subject.0 Hutchinson, 
by contrast, contends that these calls were intended to per-
suade the agencies to terminate his grants and contracts. 
5 The parties agree that Proxmire referred to research like Hutchinson's 
on at least one television show. They do not agree whether there were 
other appearances on either radio or television. Hutchinson has suggested 
that there were others and has produced affidavits to support his sugges-
tion. Proxmire cannot recall any others. 
6 Senate Resolution 543 authorized respondents and an additional mem-
ber of Proxmire's staff to give deposition testimony. 122 Cong. Rec. 
29876 (1976). 
78-680--0PINION 
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II 
On April 16, 1976, Hutchinson filed this suit in the United~ 
States District Court in Wisconsin.7 In Count I he alleget~ 
that as a result of the actions of Proxmire and Schwartz he 
has "suffered a loss of respect in his profession , has suffered 
injury to his feelings, has been humiliated, held up to public 
scorn, suffered extreme mental anguish and physical illness 
and pain to his person. Further, he has suffered a loss of in-
come and ability to earn income in the future ." Count II 
alleges that the respondents' conduct has interefered with 
Hutchinson's contractual relationships with supporters of his 
research. He later amended the complaint to add an allega-
tion that his rights of privacy and peace and tranquility have 
been infringed. 
Respondents moved for a change of venue and for summary 
judgment. In their motion for summary judgment they as-
serted that all of their acts and utterances were protected by 
the Speech or Debate Clause. In addition, they asserted that 
their criticism of the spending of public funds was privileged 
under the free speech clause of the First Amendment. They 
argued that Hutchinson was both a public figure and a public 
official, and therefore would be obliged to prove the existence 
of "actual malice." Respondents contended that the facts of 
this case would not support a finding of actual malice. 
Without ruling on venue. the District Court granted re-
spondents' motion for summary judgment. 431 F. Supp. 1311 
(WD ·wis. 1977). In so ruling, the District Court relied on 
both grounds urged by respondent. It reasoned that the 
Speech or Debate Clause afforded absolute immunity for re-
spondents' activities in investigating the funding of Hutchin-
son's research. for Proxmire's speech in the Senate, and for 
the press release covering the speech. The court concluded 
7 On April 13, 1976, Hutchinson had written to Proxmire requesting that 
he retract certain erroneous statements made in the 1975 press release. 
., 
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that the investigations and the speech were clearly within the 
ambit of the Clause. The press release was said to be pro-
tected because it fell within the 11informing function" of Con-
gress. To support its conclusion the District Court relied 
upon cases interpreting the franking privilege granted to 
Members by statute. See 39 U. S. C. § 3210. 
Although the District Court referred to the 11informing 
function" of Congress and to the franking privilege, it did not 
base its conclusion concerning the press release on those anal-
ogies. Instead, the District Court held that the 11press re- ./)- C.. 
lease, in a constitutional sens e, was no different than would 
have been a television or radio broadcast of his speech from 
the Senate floor." 8 431 F. Supp., at 1325. That the District 
Court did not rely upon the 11informing function" is clear from 
its implicit holding that the newsletters were not protected. 
The District Court then turned to the First Amendment to 
explain the grant of summary judgment on the claims arising 
from the newslette{ and interviews. It concluded that 
Hutchinson could be classified both as a ''public figure" and 
as a 11public official" for purposes of determining respondents' 
liability. !d., at 1327-1328. Having reached that conclu-
sion, the District Court relied upon the depositions, affidavits, 
and pleadings before it to evaluate Hutchinson's claim that 
respondents had acted with 11actual malice." The District 
Court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact 
on that issue. It held that neither a failure to investigate 
nor unfair editing and summarizing could establish 11actual 
malice." It aiso held that there was nothing in the affidavits 
or depositions of either Proxmire or Schwartz to indicate that 
they ever entertained any doubt about the truth of their state-
ments. Relying upon cases from other courts, the District 
Court said that in determining whether petitioner had made 
an adequate showing of "actual malice" summary judgment 
8 Of course, in light of Proxmire's uncertainty, see n. 4, supra, there is 
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might well be the rule rather than the exception. !d., at 
1330.0 
Finally, the District Court concluded: 
"But even if for the purpose of this suit it is found that 
Dr. Hutchinson is a private person so that First Amend-
ment protections do not extend to '[respondents] ,__rele~nt 
state law dictates the grant of summary judgment." 
~
The District Court held that the controlling state la.w was 
either that of Michigan or the District of Columbia. Without 
deciding which law would govern under Wisconsin's choice of 
law principles, the District Court concluded that Hutchinson 
would not be able to recover in either jurisdiction. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Speech or 
Debate Clause protected the statements made in the press re-
lease and in the newsletters. 579 F. 2d 1027 (CA7 1978). It 
interpreted Doe v. McMillan, 414 U. S. 306 (1973), as recog-
nizing a limited protection for the "informing function" of 
Congress and concluded that distribution of both the press · 
release and the newsletters did not exceed the amounts re-
quired for legislative purposes. 579 F. 2d, at 1033. The 
follow-up telephone calls and the statements made by Prox-
mire on television and radio were not protected by the Speech 
or Debate Clause; they were, however, held by. the Court of 
Appeals to be protected by ·the First Amendment.10 It 
9 Considering the nuances of the issues raised here, we are constrained 
to express some doubt about the so-called " rule. " The proof of "actual 
malice" C.'dls a defendant's state of mind into question·, N ew York Times v : 
Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254 (1964) , and do·es not readily lend itselfto summary 
disposition . See 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§2730, at 590-592. Cf. H erbert v. Lando, - U. S. - (1979) . In the 
present posture of the case, however, the propriety of dealing with such 
comple:x issues by summary judgment is not before us. 
10 Respondents did not cross-petition. Neither did they argue that the 
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reached that conclusion after first finding that, based on the 
affidavits and pleadings of record, Hutchinson was a "public 
figure." 11 The Court then examined the record to determine 
whether there had been a showing by Hutchinson of "actual 
malice." It agreed with the District Court "that, upon this 
record, there is no question that [respondents] did not have 
knowlege of the actual or probable 'falsity' of their state-
ments." !d., at 1035. The Court of Appeals also rejected 
Hutchinson's argument that the District Court had erred in 
granting summary judgment on the claimed wrongs other 
than defamation-interference with contractual relations, in-
tentional infliction of emotional anguish, and invasion of 
privacy: 
"We view these additional allegations of harm as merely 
the results of the statements made by the defendants. If 
the alleged defamatory falsehoods themselves are privi-
leged, it would defeat the privilege to allow recovery for 
the specified damages which they caused." !d., at 1036.12 
As noted earlier, the Court of Appeals did not review the Dis-
trict Court's holding that state law also justified summary 
judgment for respondents. 
III 
The petition for certiorari raises three questions, One in-
.volves the scope of the Speech or r5'ebate Clau; ; another 
involves First Amendment claims; a third concerns the ap-
propriateness of summary judgment, embracing both a con-
Schwartz to governmental agencies or the television and radio interviews 
of Proxmire. Accordingly, we have not reviewed the conclusion of the 
Court of Appeals that the Speech or Debate Clause does not protect those 
actions. 
11 The Court did not decide whether the District Court was correct in 
concluding that Hutchinson was also a "public official." 579 F. 2d, at 
1035 n. 14. 
12 Petitioner has not sought review of this conclusion; we express no 
opinion as to its correctne<:s. 
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stitutional issue and a state-law issue. The constitutional 
issue arose from the District Court's view that solicitude for 
the First Amendment required a more hospitable judicial at-
titude toward granting summary jud!!ment in a libel case. 
Seen. 9, supra. The state-law issue arose because the District 
Court concluded that, as a matter of local law, Hutchinson 
could not recover. 
Our practice is to avoid reaching constitutional questions 
if a dispositive nonconstitutiomll ground is available. See, 
e. q. , Siler v. Louisville & Nash1·ille R. Co. , 213 U. S. 175, 193 
(1909). Were we to follow that course here we would remand 
to the Court of Appeals to review the state-law question which 
it did not consider. If the District Court correctly decided 
the state-law question. resolution of the First Amendment 
issue would be unnecessary. We conclude, however, that spe-
cial considerations in this case mandate that we first resolve 
the Speech or Debate Clam:e question. 
The purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect 
Members of Congress "not only from the consequences of 
litigation's results but also from the burden of defending 
themselves." Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82, 85 
(1967). See alw Eastland v. United S ervicemen's Fund, 421 
U. S. 491 , 503 (1975). If the respondents have immunity 
under the Clause, no other questions need be considered for 
they may "not be questioned in any other place." 
In support of the Court of Appeals' holding that new·sletters 
and press releases are protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause, respondents rely upon both historical precedent a.nd 
present-day congressional practices. They contend that im-
petus for the Speech or Debate Clause privilege in our Con-
stitution came from the history of parliamentary efforts to 
protect the right of members to criticize the spendin.g of the 
Crown and from the prosecution of a Speaker of the House of 
Commons for publication of a report outside of Parliament. 
Respondents also contend that in the modern day very little 
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speech or debate occurs on the floor of either House; from 
this they argue that press releases and newsletters are n.eces-
sary for Members of Congress to communicate with other 
Members. For example, in his deposition Proxmire testified: 
"I have found in 19 years in the Senate that very often a 
statement on the floor of the Senate or something that 
appears in the Congressional Record misses the atten~ion 
of most members of the Senate, and virtually all members 
of the House, because they don't read the Congressional 
Record. If they are handed a news release, or something, 
that is going to call it to their attention .... " App., at 
220. 
0 
Respondents also argue that an essential part of the duties of 
a Member of Congress is to inform constituents, as well as 
other Members, of the issues being considered. 
The Speech or Debate Clause has been directly passed on 
by this Court relatively few times in 190 years. Eastland v. 
United Servir;emen's Fund, 421 U. S'l'\(1975): Doe v. McMil- .fi\ 
Zan, 412 U. S. 306 (1973); Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. A 
606 (1972); United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1972); 
Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U. S. 82 ( 1 967) ; United States 
v. Jnhnsnn, 383 U. S. 169 (1966): Kilbourn v. Thon1-pson, 103 
U. S. 168 (1881). Literal reading of the Clause would, of 
course, confine its protection narrowly to a "Speech or Debate 
in either House." But the Court has given the Clause a prac-
tical rather than a strictly literal reading which would limit 
the protection to utterances made within the four walls of 
either Chamber. Thus, we have held that committee hear-
ings are protected, even if held outside the Chambers; com-
mittee reports are also protected. Doe v. McMillan, supra; 
Gravel v. United States, supra. Cf. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 
1, 27-28 (1808). 
The gloss going beyond a strictly literal reading of the 
Clause has not, however, departed from the objective of pro-
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tecting only legislative activities. In Thomas Jefferson's 
VIew, 
"[The privilege] is restrained to things done in the House 
in a Parliamentary course, . . . . For [the Member] is 
not to have privilege contra morem parliamentarium, to / 
exceed the bounds and limits of his place and duty." T / ? 
Jefferson, A Manual of Parliamentary Practice 20 (1851) :-- <: 
reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 704 (S. Pado~ 
1943). 
One of the draftsmen of the Constitution, James Wilson, 
expressed a similar thought in lectures delivered between 1790 
and 1792 while he was a Justice of this Court. He rejected 
Blackstone's statement, 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *164, 
that Parliament's privileges were preserved by keeping them 
indefinite: 
"Very different is the case with regard to the legisla-
ture of the United States. . . . The great maxims, upon 
which our law of parliament is founded, are defined and 
ascertained in our constitutions. The arcana of privi-
lege, and the arcana of prerogative, are equally unknown 
to our system of jurisprudence." 2 The Works of James 
Wilson 35 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).13 
In this respect Wilson was underscoring the very purpose of 
our Constitution-inter alia, to provide written definitions of 
-~privileges>.=:-and immunities granted rather than 
rely on evolving constitutional concepts identified from di-
verse sources as in English law. Like thoughts were expressed 
by Joseph Story, writing in the first edition of this Commen.:. 
taries on the Constitution in 1833: 
"But this privilege is strictly confined to things done in 
the course of parliamentary proceedings, and does not 
13 But see T . Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice 15-16 (1854), 
reprinted in The Complete Jefferson 702 (8. Padover ed. 1943) (quoting 
Blackstone with approval). 
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cover things done beyond the place and limits of duty.'1 
I d., § 863, at 320. 
Cf. Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 34 (1808). 
In United States v. Brewster, 408 U. S. 501 (1971), we 
acknowledged the historical roots of the Clause going back to 
the long struggle between the English House of Commons and 
the Tudor and Stuart monarchs when both criminal and civil 
processes were employed by crown authority to intimidate 
legislators. Yet we cautioned that the Clause 
"must be interpreted in light of the America11 experience, 
and in the context of the American constitutional scheme 
of government rather than the English parliamentary 
system. . . . [T]heir Parliament is the supreme author-
ity, not a coordinate branch. Our speech or debate privi-
lege was designed to preserve legislative independence, 
not supremacy." 408 U. S., at 508. 
Nearly a century ago, in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U. S. 
168, 204 (1881), this Court held that the Clause extended "to 
things generally done in a session of the House by one of its 
members in relation to the business before it." (Emphasis 
added.) More recently we expressed a similar definition of 
the scope of the Clause: 
"Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart 
of the Clause is speech or debate in either House. Inso-
far as the Cla.use is construed to reach other matters, th'3 y 
must be an integral part of the deliberative and commu-
nicative processes by which Members participate in com-
mittee and House proceedings with respedt to the con- • 
sideration al}d passage or rejection of proposed legislation 
or with respect to other matters which the Constitution 
places within the jurisdiction of either. House. As the 
Court of Appeals· put it, ·the courts have · extended · the 
privilege to matters beyond pure .speech or debate jn 
either House, but 'only when necessary to prevent indirect 
14 
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impairment of such deliberations.'" Gravel v. United 
States , supra, at 625 ~(quoting United States v. 
Doe, 455 F. 2d 753, 760 (CAl 1972)) (emphasis added). 
Cf. Doe v. McMillan, supra, at 313-314, 317; United States v. 
Brewster, supra, at 512, 515-516, 517-518 .~.~Long v. 
Ansell, 293 U. S. 76, 82 (1934). 
Whatever imprecision there may be in the term "legislative 
activities," it is clear that nothing in history or in the explicit 
language of the Clause suggests any intention to create an 
absolute privilege from liability or suit for defamatory state-
ments made outside the Chamber. In Brewster, supra, at 
507, we observed: 
"The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were 
not written into the Constitution simply for the personal 
or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect 
the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the 
independence of individual legislators." 
Claims under the Clause going beyond what is needed to pro-
tect legislative independence are to be closely scrutinized. 
In Brewster we took note of this: 
"The authors of our Constitution were well aware of both 
the need for the privilege and the abuses that could flow 
from too sweeping safeguards. In order to preserve other 
values, they wrote the privilege so that it tolerates and 
protects behavior on the part of Members not tolerated 
and protected when done by other citizens, but the shield 
does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve the 
integrity of the legislative process." I d., at 517 (em-
phasis added). 
Indeed, the precedents abundantly support the conclusion \ 
that a Member may be held liable for republishing defamatory 
state~r!gii1alry maae ill e1ther -no use. We preceiv'e no 
basis for departing from that long-established rule. 
Justice Story in his Commentaries, for example, explained 
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that there was no immunity for republication of a speech first 
delivered in Congress: 
"Therefore, although a speech delivered in the house of 
commons is privileged, and the memb~r cannot be ques-
tioned respecting it elsewhere; yet, if he publishes his 
speech, and it contains libellous matter, he is liable to an 
action and prosecution therefore, as in common cases of 
libel. And the same principles seem ap.plicable to the 
privilege of debate and speech in congress. No man 
ought to have a right to defame others under colour of a 
performance of the duties of his office. And if he does 
so in the actual discharge of his duties in congress, that 
furnishes no reason, why he should be enabled through 
the medium of the press to destroy the reputation, and 
invade the repose of other citizens. It is neither within 
the scope of his duty, nor in furtherance of public rights, 
or public policy. Every citizen has as good a right to be 
protected by the laws from malign~nt scandal, and false o... 
charges, and defamatory imputations, as a member of 
congress has to utter them in his seat." 14 J. Story, Com-
H Story acknowledged the arguments to the contrary: "It is proper, 
however, to apprise the learned reader that it has been recently denied in 
congress by very distinguished lawyers, that. the privilege of speech and 
debate in congress does not extend to publication of his speech. And they 
ground themselves upon an important. distinction arising from the actual 
differences between English and American legislation. In the former, the 
publication of the debates is not strictly lawful, except by license of the 
house. In the latter, it is a common right, exercised and supported by the 
direct encouragement of the body. This reasoning deserves a very atten-
tive examination." J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 863, at 
329--330 ( 1833) . 
At oral argument counsel for respondents referred to a note in the fifth 
edition of the Commentaries saying that the Speech or Debate Clause 
protected the circulation to constituents of copies of speeches made in 
Congress. Tr. of Oral Arg. 43. In attributing the note to Story counsel 
made an understandable mistake. As explained in the preface to the fifth 
edition, that note was added by the editor, Melville Bigelow. The note 
16 
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mentaries on the Constitution § 863, at 329 (1833) (em-
phasis added). 
See also L. Cushing, Elements of the Law and Practice of 
Legislative Assemblies in the United States of America ~ 604, 
at p. 244 (2d ed. 1863). 
Story summarized the state of the common law at the time 
the Constitution was drafted recalling that Parliament had by 
then succeeded in its struggle to secure freedom of debate. 
But the privilege did not extend to republication of tibellous .1 r f ? 
remarks even though first made in Parliament. Thus,Tn Rex 
v. Lord Abingdon, 1 Esp. 225, 170 Eng. Rep. 337 (N. P. 1794), 
Lord Chief Justice Kenyon rejected Lord Abingdon's argu-
ment that parliamentary privilege protected him from suit for 
republication of a speech first made in the House of Lords: 
"[A]s to the words in question, had they been spoken in 
the House of Lords, and confined to its walls, [the] Court 
would have had no jurisdiction to call his Lordship before 
them, to answer for them as an offence; but . . . in the 
present case, the offence was the publication under his 
authority and sanction, and at his expense: ... a mem-
ber of Parliament had certainly a right to publish his 
speech, but that speech should not be made the vehicle 
of slander against any individual; if it was, it was a 
libel. ... " Id., at 228, 170 Eng. Rep., at 338. 
A similar result was reached in Rex v. Creevey, 1 M. & S. 273, 
105 Eng. Rep. 102 (K. B. 1813). 
does not appear in Story's first edition. Moreover, it is clear from the 
text of the note and the sources cited, that Bigelow did not mean that 
there was absolute privilege for defamatory remarks contained in a speech 
mailed to constituents as there would be if the mailing was protected by 
t.he Speech or Debate Clause. Instead, he suggest that there was a quali-
fied privilege, akin to that for accurate newspaper reports of legislative 
proceedings. Cf. McGovern v. Martz, 182 F. Supp. 343, 347-348 (DC 
1960) (republication of a speech has only qualified privilege). Since re-
spondents have not claimed a qualified privilege we do not consider 
whether they would be entitled to it. 
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In Gravel v. United States, 408 U. S. 606, 622-626 (1972), 
we recognized that the doctrine denying immunity for repub-
lication had been accepted in the United States: 
"[P]rivatc publication by Senator Gravel . . was in ·no 
way essential to the deliberations of the Senate; nor docs 
questioning as to the private publication threaten the 
integrity or independence of the Senate by impermis_sibly 
exposing its deliberations to executive influence." I d., 
at 625. 
We reaffirmed that principle in Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 
306, 314-315 (1973): 
"A Member of Congress may not with impunity publish 
a libel from the speaker's stand in his home district, and 
clearly the Speech or Debate Clause would not protect 
such an act even though the libel was read from an official 
committee report. The reason is that republishing a 
libel under such circumstances is not an essential part of 
the legislative process and is not part of that deliberative 
process 'by which Members participate in committee and 
House proceedings.'" (Quoting from Gravel v. United 
States, 408 U. S. 606, 625 (1972).) 15 
We reach a similar conclusion here. A speech by Proxmire 
in the Senate would be wholly immune{!hd copies of that 
speech would be available to other Members o~Congress and 
the public through the Congressional Record;_] But neither 
the newsletters nor the press release was "essential to the 
deliberations of the Senate" and neither was part of the de-
liberative process. 
Respondents, however, argue that newsletters and press re-
leases are essential to the functioning of the Senate; without 
15 It is worth noting that the Rules of the Senate forbid disparagement 
of other Members on the floor. Senate Rule XIX (April 1979). See also 
T. Jefferson, Manual of Parliamentary Practice 40-41 (1854), reprinted 
in The Complete Jefferson 714-715 (S. Padover ed. 1943). 
-
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them, they assert, a Senator cannot have a significant impact 
on the other Senators. \Ve may assume that a Member's 
published statements exert some influence on other votes in 
the Congress and therefore have a relationship to the legisla-
tive and deliberative process. But in Brewster, supra , at 512, 
we rejected respondents' expansive reading of the Clause: 
"It is well known, of course, that Members of the Con-
gress engage in many activities other than the purely 
legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate 
Clause. These include ... preparing so-called 'news 
letters' to constituents, news releases, and speeches de-
livered outside the Congress." 
There we ·went on to note that Johnson had carefully dis-
tinguished between what is only "related to the due function-
ing of the legislative process," and what constitdes the 
legislative process entitled to immunity under the Clause: 
"In stating that those things [Johnson's attempts to in-
fluence the Department of Justice] 'in no wise related to 
the due functioning of the legislative process' were not 
covered by the privilege, the Court did not in any sense 
imply as a corollary that everything tha.t 'related' to the 
office of a Member was shielded by the Clause. Quite 
the contrary, in Johnson we held, citing Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, supra, that only acts generally done in the 
course of the process of enacting legislation were 
protected. 
"In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as 
protecting all conduct relating to the legislative process." 
"In its narrowest scope, the Clause is a very large, albeit 
essential. grant of privilege. It has enabled reckless men 
to slander [by speech or debate] and even destroy others 
with impunity, but that was the conscious choice of the 
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Framers. !d., at 513-516. · (Emphasis m original; 
citations omitted.) 
We are unable to discern any "conscious choice" to grant im-
munity for defamatory statements scattered far and wide by 
mail, press)and the electronic media. )' 
Respondents also argue that newsletters and press releases 
are privileged as part of the "informing function" of Con-
gress. Advocates of a broad reading of the "informing furic-
tion" sometimes tend to confuse two uses of the term "in-
forming." In one sense, Congress informs itself collectively 
by way of hearings of its committees. It was in that sense 
that Woodrow Wilson used "informing" in a statement quoted 
by respondents. In reality, Wilson's . statement related · to 
congressional efforts to learn of the activities of the Executive 
Branch and administrative agencies; he did not include wide-
ranging inquiries by individual Members on subjects of their 
choice. Moreover, Wilson's statement itself clearly implies 
a distinction between the informing function and the legisla-
tive function: 
"Unless Congress have and use every means of acquaint-
ing itself with the acts and the disposition of the adminis-
trative agents of the government, the country must be 
helpless to learn how it is being served; and unless Con-
gress both scrutinize these things and sift them by every 
form of discussion, the country must remain in embar-
rassing, crippling ignorance of the very affairs which it is 
most important that it should understand and direct . 
. The informing function of Congress should be preferred 
even to its legislative function. . . . [T]he only really 
self-governing people is that people which discusses and 
interrogates its administration. W. Wilson, Congres-
sional Government 303 ( 1885). 
It is in this narrower Wilsonian sense that this Court has 
employed "informing" in previous cases holding that con-:-
78-680-0PINION 
20 HUTCHINSON v. PROXMIRE 
gressional efforts to inform itself through committee hearings 
are part of the legislative function. 
The other sense of the term, and the one relied upon by 
respondents, perceives it to be the duty of Members to tell the 
public about their activities. Valuable and desirable as it 
may be in broad terms, the transmittal of such information 
by individual Members in order to inform the public and other 
Members is not a part of the legislative function or the delib-
erations that make up the legislative process.18 As a result, 
transmittal of such information by press releases and news-
letters is not protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U. S. 306 ( 1973) , is not to the con-
trary. It dealt only with reports from congressional commit-
tees, and held that Members of Congress could not be held 
liable for voting to publish a report. Voting and preparing 
committee reports are the individual and collective expressions 
of opinion within the legislative process. As such, they are 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Newsletters and 
press releases, by contrast, are primarily means of informing 
those outside the legislative forum; they represent the views 
and will of a single Member. It does not disparage either 
their value or their importance to hold that they are not en-
titled to the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause. 
We conclude, therefore, that the Speech or Debate Clause 
does not protect newsletters or press releases and reverse that 
part of the judgment of the Court of Appeals holding to the 
contrary. "'We do not reach the other questions presented by 
the petition for certiorari but remand the case to the Court of 
Appeals for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
Reversed and remanded. 
~~? 
~~ 
16 Provision for the use of the frank, 39 U. S. C. § 3210, does not alter J-- A 
our conclusion. Congress, by granting franking privileges, stationery al- -t~ lA ~ 
lowances, and facilities to record speeches and statements for ra.dio broad-
cast cannot expand the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause to render ~ t~ ~ 
immune all that emanates via use of such helpful facilities. Ll, 
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MEMORANDUM TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Hutchinson v. Proxmire, No. 78-680 
DATE: May 28, 1979 
In substance the Chief's opinion seems fairly good. I 
think it has two problems, however, one major and one minor. 
The minor problem is on page 17, in the last full 
paragraph, where the opinion states: "A speech by Proxmire in 
the Senate would be wholly immune and copies of that speech 
would be available to other Members of Congress and the public 
through the Congressional Record."(emphasis added) The 
italicized portion of that sentence strongly implies that 
publication in the Congressional Record also would be wholly 
immune. Yet the opinion, on page 4 note 4, expressly disclaims 
deciding whether the Congressional Record is covered by the 
Clause. 
It seems to me that the Court would do well not to 
decide this question. Some functions of the Congressional 
Record probably are covered, but I doubt that every publication 
and distribution is. Certainly Proxmire could not put his 
speech in the Record, then distribute xeroxed copies to his 
constituents and still claim the privilege. In short, I 
recommend the italicized language be deleted. 
The major problem is the disposition of the balance of 
the case. Having decided that Proxmire's conduct is not 
privileged under the Clause, the Court must say something 
further about it. As I understood the sense of the Conference, 
the balance of the judgment dismissing the case was to be 
vacated and the court below was to be directed to reach the 
state-law question ahead of the First Amendment issues. The 
Chief's opinion, however, does not do this. Indeed, it fairly 
could be read as affirming that portion of the judgment of the 
court below not based on the Speech or Debate Clause. 
I am confident that you do not wish to affirm any 
portion of the judgment; my recollection is that you consented 
only with reluctance to a disposition that would not reverse on 
First Amendment grounds as well. I recommend that you ask the 
Chief to add something on page 10 of the opinion and in the 
final paragraph directing the court below to decide the state 
law question and making it clear that the Court does not 
the resolution of the First Amendment issue by the court 
May 28, 1979 
78-680 Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief: 
I am not entirely clear as to the scope of your 
"holding" in this case. 
You conclude that the Speech or Debate Clause does 
not protect newsletters or oress releases, and "reverse that 
part of the judgment of the Court of A~peals". But you "do 
not reach the other questions ~resented ••• [andl remand 
the case to th~ Court of Appeals for further proceedings". 
The other two questions as identified in the 
op1n1on are (i) whether. Hutchinson is a public fiqure, and 
(ii) whether respondents were entitled to summary judgment. 
There was, as I understood it, another question: what should 
we do about the final holding of the District Court that even 
if Hutchinson were a "private person ••• relevant state law 
dictates the grant of summary judgment". The Court of 
Appeals was silent on this state-law issue. My recollection 
is that a majority of the Conference thought we should vacate 
the judgment of CA7 in its entirety, and remand the case to 
it to consider first the state-law issue (which could be 
decisive), and thereafter- if reached- the "private person" 
issue under federal law. 
My own view, expressed at Conference, was that in 
addition to deciding the Speech or Debate Clause issue, we 
should hold that Hutchinson is a private rather than a public 
person, and resolve that issue. Otherwise, on remand, CA7 
may well reaffirm its decision that Hutchinson was a public 
figure, if it gets by the state law question. We-then will 
probably be called upon to review the case again. 
But my view did not prevail at Conference. I 
therefore am willing to join your opinion for the Court if 
the entire judgment of CA7 is vacated, and the remand is 
2. 
limited to the state-law issue. I possibly could join the 
judgment if the decision below iq vacat~d, ~nd the remand is 
limited first to the state-law isSUP and then to the "private 
person" question. 
I think your treatment of the Speech or DRbate 
Clause is excellent. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
P.S. On page 17, the sentence near the bottom to the effect 
that a Senator's speech may be available to the "oublic 
through the Conqressional Record" may need to be clarified. 
This might be construed to allow a Senator to ~eproduce 
copies of the Conqr~ssional Record and mail them, with full 
protection of the Clause, to a 100,000 people as did Proxmire 
with his newsletter. 
lfp/ss 
CHAMBERS OF . 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.:§upum.t ~curl o-f tqt ~ttittb ~hdte 
.. aelfingttm. ~. ~· · 211,?'1.~ 
May 29, 1979 
Re: No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief: 
This is in response to your note of May 26, 
circulated today. At Conference I took the position 
that the petitioner was not a public figure. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
• 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
Re: 
.§npmtt.t ~nmt of tfr~ ~ttitdt .;§taus 
)rasfrittgtnn. ~. QJ. 20gtJ.l.~ 
May 29, 1979 
78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire & Schwartz 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Si:ncerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
,ju.p:rttttt <!JMttt ttf tqt ~a ,jtatts 
._asftinghtn. ~. <!J. 2!l,?'k$ 
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
May 29, 1979 
Re: No. 78-680, Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Lewis: 
As I indicated in my post-circulation memorandum to the 
Conference, I would be willing to add a section to hold that 
Hutchinson was not a public figure, if there are five votes for 
that position under the circumstances of this case. There are 
sound reasons to dispose of that issue, which is essentially a 
question of law. 
In response to your note, the present draft holds that the 
Speech or Debate Clause does not protect the newsletters or 
press releases. The CA7 should also realize that on remand it 
must consider whether the District Court correctly resolved the 
state law question. To avoid any uncertainty about that 
holding, however, I am quite willing to change the final 
sentence of the opinion to read: "We do not reach the other 
questions presented by the petition for certiorari; instead, we 
vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion, in 
particular, to determine whether the District Court correctly 
resolved the question of state law." 
Bill Rehnquist's opinion in Wolston v. Reader's Digest may 
well have an influence on the CA7's view on remand. I will 
take that into account when Wolston comes around. 
The comment on page 17 about the Congressional Record is, 
or at least I thought, a non-committal observation of the fact 
that everyone has access to the Congressional Record. I did 
not think this conflicted with note 4. However, I will see if 
there is need to neutralize it. Perhaps striking the phrase 
"copies of that speech" would do the trick. 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
May 29, 1979 
78-680 Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief: 
Thank you for your memos on the above case. 
In response to your inquiry, I think we should 
reach and decide the "public fiqure" issue. 
As I have indicated, it would not be unreasonable 
for CA7 to adh~re to the view that Hutchinson is a public 
figure unless we decide the question. It has been argued and 
I think it was before us. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
CHA~BERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVEN S 
~ltpr.tm:t Ofqnrlltf tlrt ~ftb ~htttll' 
Ji¥.ltittghm. ~. Of. 2.0~}J.$ 
May 29, 1979 
Re: 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief: 
Although I would also join an opinion holding 
that Hutchinson is not a public figure, as suggested 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
j;u:puntt Q}llltrl of tqt ~~ ,jhtttll 
~rurfrin-gtttn.lfl. <!f. 2iT&TJI.~ 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART May 30, 1979 
Re: 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief: 
It is my view that the petitioner is not a 
public figure, and I hope that in this opinion we 
can hold that he is not. The only substantial 
affirmative problem I have with your circulated 
opinion concerns the last sentence of footnote 14 
on page 16. This sentence seems implicitly to 
/
suggest that the defendants may enjoy a qualified 
privilege as a matter of federal law. I do not agree, 
and believe we would only be borrowing trouble in mak-
ing such a suggestion. Accordingly, I hope that you 
will be willing to delete this sentence. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
.:§n:prtttt.t Qfcttrl cl tJrt ~tb' .;§tatt.s 
jlrcu!p:ttghm.1§. Qf. 2n~~~ 
/ 
June 5, 1979 
Re: No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me in your presently circulating draft in 
this case. I would have no objection to reaching the "public 
figure" issue if it can be done without violating the 
traditional maxim that we avoid constitutional adjudication 
unless it is necessary. I am entirely satisfied with your 
reason for reaching the Speech or Debate Clause expressed I( 
in the present circulation, but think it might be a trickier 
job to reach the "public figure" issue in the case. 
Sincerely/" 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
;ittpTmtt <If curl cf tqt ~nittb ;§taUs 




JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE June 7' 1979 
Re: No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief, 
I am still with you. 
Sincerely yours, 
!4----------
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
erne 
lfp/ss 
~npume {!fcurlltf flrt ~niult .:§hrltll' 
~rur.£ringtcn.l9. <q. 20gt'!~ 
Ct-4AMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
June 7, 19?9 
Re: 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxrnire 
Dear Chief: 
My join still holds. 
Respectfully, 
i~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBER S OF" 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~u:p-rtntt <qa-ttd cf t4t 'JI;ittitt~ ~htus 
'~htsJri:ttgtctt, 111. <!f. 20&f'12 
June 11, 1979 
Re: No. 78-680 - Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief: 
Please "join" or "re-join" me in your most recent 
circulation, whichever is appropriate. 
Sincerely, 
~v-
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
j)uprtntt <!fond of t4t ~b ;§taftg 
1lhtllJrhtghtn. ~. <!f. 2.0gP~~ 
CHAMI!IERS Of" 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 19, 1979 
Re: No. 78-680 - Hutchinson '-:· l?roxmire 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
f. fYI . 
T ,M. 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUST I C E POTTER S T EWART 
~uprtntt (!fmtrlltf Urt~~ .®taUs 
~cur~~. Q]. 20gtJI.~ 
June 20, 1979 
Re: No. 78-680, Hutchinson v. Proxmire 
Dear Chief, 
I regret my inadvertence in not responding 
earlier to your recirculation. Please add the fol-
lowing at the foot of your opinion for the Court: 
Mr. Justice Stewart joins in all 
but footnote 10 of the Court•s op1n1on. 
He cannot agree that the question whether 
a communication by a Congressman or a mem-
ber of his staff with a federal agency is 
entitled to Speech or Debate Clause immu-
nity depends upon whether the communication 
is defamatory. Because telephone calls to 
federal agency officials are a routine and 
essential part of the Congressional over-
sight function, he believes such activity 
is protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. 
This brief statement reflects the views I 
voicedduring our Conference discussion. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
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